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COMMENTS

STATE EXPANSION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE AND
McGEE CASES
Jurisdiction of state courts over non-resident natural persons and
foreign corporations has been a continuing process of expansion. This
began with Pennoyer v. Neff' in 1877 and culminated with McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co.2 in 1957.

Ever since Pennoyer v. Neff, it has been established that there are
limits to a state's power to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over persons and that these limits are controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding unreasonable exercise of power. It is
further established that under the Amendment there are two fundamental requirements of reasonableness in the exercise of state judicial
power over persons. 1) There must be a relation or tie between the
state and the person which makes it reasonable for a state to make the
persons subject to the state's control or power through its courts. This
relation or tie is called the basis of personal jurisdiction. 2) There
must be reasonable notification to the person that the state is asserting
judicial control over him. This is done by service of summons calling
him to appear before a court and defend this summons.
Pennoyer v. Neff concluded that the only relation or tie between
a state and person which satisfied the first requirement was presence
within the state. Consequently, the second requirement of notification
could be satisfied only by service within the boundaries of the state
whether the person notified be a resident or a nonresident of that state.
This holding as to presence was founded on the territorial concept
of state power, the court saying that every state "possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory," and from this it follows as a corollary that no state can "extend
its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or prop3
erty to its decisions."1
While presence within a state still remains the fundamentally sufficient basis, gradual departures from Pennoyer v. Neff have developed.
These departures have expanded both the range of the basis and the
range of the notification. In this expansion, the cases have distinguished
between natural persons and corporations.
NATURAL PERSONS

One departure from the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff came in
Milliken v. Meyer.4 In this case, the Court gave its qualified approval
195 U.S. 714 (1877).

U.S. 220 (1957).
Supra note 1, at 722.
4311 U.S. 457 (1940). See Wis. STAT. §262.08 (4) (1957). Note that this section provides for in personam jurisdiction if a resident departed for purpose
2355
3
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to domicile as an independent basis for personal jurisdiction where
a domiciliary had been personally served in Colorado with a process
emanating from a Wyoming court. The Court said that a domiciliary
must accept burdens as well as the benefits of domicile and one of the
burdens was subjection to jurisdiction by that state. The case was significant also for its approving service of process outside the territorial
limits of the state. Domicile, not presence in the state, furnished the
basis for personal jurisdiction and process outside the state was simply
looked on as a "reasonable method for apprising such an absent party
of the proceeding against him."5
Another departure from the Pennoyer doctrine was the tie or
nexus of previous consent by a nonresident to the service of the summons within a state on an agent of a nonresident in an action arising
out of a dangerous activity of the nonresident within the state. 6 The
consent, express or implied, to the appointment could be exacted by
the forum state because the state could exclude the dangerous activity
entirely unless such consent was given. In Hess v. Pawloski7 the
Court upheld a nonresident motorist statute, which has become the
basic model for present day statutes. Under this statute, the mere act
of driving within the state was deemed to constitute the appointment
of an appropriate official for service. The difference between express
and implied consent was unimportant. The Court emphasized that the
dangerous character of automobiles justified the statute as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power to preserve the citizens' safety.
The exaction of consent was a regulation reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of nonresidents because the statute operated,
...to require a nonresident to answer for his conduct in the
state where arise causes of action alleged against him, as well as
to provide for a claimant a convenient method by which he may
sue to enforce his rights.8
Similar statutes have been upheld where the activity of the nonresident is business posing a threat of potential financial harm rather
than actual physical danger. An example of this type statute is seen
in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman. In this case, the Court sus-

tained a state statute permitting service on an agent of a nonresident
individual who was engaged in the sale of corporate securities in the
state in actions arising out of that business. The Court accepted the
state court's view that the sale of securities was an exceptional busiof avoiding process. However, the Restatement does not seem to include this
intention to avoid process as a requirement for in personan jurisdiction over
a domiciliary not in the forum. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §16 (1942).
5 Milliken v. Meyer, supra note 4, at 464; Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based
on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 522, 536.
6Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).

7274 U.S. 352 (1927).
S Id.at 356.

1959]

COMMENTS

ness which could be subjected to special regulations and noted that
the statute could be sustained by going no farther than the Hess v.
Pawloski principle.9

The basis of previous consent resulting from a dangerous activity
within the state was applicable to foreign corporations as well as
individuals.10
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS"1

The development in the case of foreign corporations was different
from that of nonresident natural persons because a corporation being
a legal entity could have no physical existence in a state as such. Thus,
the early rule with respect to corporations was that it could be sued
only in the state of its incorporation because it had no legal existence
12
elsewhere.
With the increasing growth and perplexity of commerce and the
extension of business activities and operations by corporations beyond
the states of their origination, the rule became unsatisfactory as a
means of protecting the rights of persons dealing with such corporations. It was also unrealistic as a means of making corporations
subject to personal jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which they
carried on business. The doctrine then evolved that the tie or nexus
between a foreign corporation and the state in which it is doing business is such as to make it reasonable for the state to make it subject
to state judicial control with reference to claims against it arising out
13
of business done within the state.
What constituted "doing business" was a matter of fact and the
decisions were divergent but the rule could be summarized that the
activities of the foreign corporation in the state should be to some
extent continuous, rather than a single or sporadic activity, 4 and even
if continuous, must be more than mere solicitation.' 5
Two different theories of the sufficiency of "doing business" basis
were offered by the Court. In some cases it was said that "doing
business" was evidence of the "presence" of the corporation in the
state. Just as the "presence" of an individual in the state is a basis
9 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
'DRESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §28

(1942).

" For an excellent discussion on expansion of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, see Keane and Collins, Changing Concepts of What Constitutes
"Doing Business" by Foreign Corporations,42 MARQ. L. Rxv. 151 (1958). The
article deals extensively with the Wisconsin statutes involved in this area.
12 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839); Peckham v. North Parish in
Haverhill, 16 Pick, 274 (Mass. 1834).
13 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §30 (1942).

14 Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85 (1933); Rosenberg Co. v.
'5

Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907) ; International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
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under the Pennoyer doctrine, so the "presence" of the corporation is
equally a valid basis.

16

In other cases it was suggested that by "doing business" in a state
the foreign corporation "impliedly consents" to the exercise of jurisdiction over it.1?

Neither "presence" nor "consent" furnished an entirely satisfactory
theory of a state's judicial power over foreign corporations. This inadequacy was recognized by the Supreme Court and the Court redefined the basis of state judicial power in International Shoe Co. v.
8

State of Washington.1

EXTENDED BASIS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SHOE-MINIMUM CONTACTS

In this case the Supreme Court redefined the basis of state judicial
power over persons. This new definition resulted in an expansion of
such power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court applied the new basis to the following facts. The defendant shoe company had its home office in St. Louis. It employed
about a dozen residents of Washington who regularly solicited orders
from retailers in Washington. The orders were forwarded to St.
Louis and accepted there. The items were shipped through interstate
commerce direct to the Washington retailers and sales resulted in an
annual business in Washington of about $31,000. The State of Washington brought this action in one of its courts to collect contributions
alleged owing to the state's unemployment fund by reason of commissions paid by the defendant to its salesmen. Service was made locally
on one of the defendant's salesmen and also by registered mail to the
home office. The defendant insisted that its activities in Washington
were merely solicitation and therefore it was not "doing business" and
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Washington courts.
In holding that Washington had jurisdiction over the defendant
the Court redefined the basis of personal jurisdiction as follows:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personan, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 9
The court added that the demands of due process:
..may be met by such contacts of [the defendant] with the state

of the forum as to make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require [the defendant] to defend
the particular suit which is brought there. An estimate of the
16 Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Ry., supra note 15.
17

St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) ; Old Wayne Life Ass'n. v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8 (1907).
See also Foster, supra note 5, at 535.

18 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19 Id. at 316.
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'inconveniences' which would result to the [defendant] from a
trial away from its 'home'
or principal place of business is
20
relevant in this connection.

Having redefined the new basis the Court concluded that:
It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or
ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just,
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which
appellant has incurred there. Hence we cannot say that the
maintenance of the present suit in the State
21 of Washington involves an unreasonable or undue procedure.
From the facts it is evident that the precise, actual, jurisdictional
question decided in the International Shoe case was that where a
foreign corporation's continuous solicitation activities in a state produced a substantial volume of interstate business in the state and the
cause of action sought to be enforced arose out of such activities, they
were sufficient under the newly defined basis.
While it was thus clear that the solicitation-plus rule of the "doing
business" basis had been abolished, the decision left vague the exact
scope of the new basis. Was continuous activity still required or could
the newly defined basis be stretched to cover a single activity within
the state whether or not it was a single tort or a single business transaction ?
The doubt was engendered in part because the Court in its opinion
furnished no express compass or chart as to the foundation or legal
theory underlying this vague basis of "fair play."
In the years following the Shoe case, the Court threw no light on
what the foundation of this basis might be, except in Travelers Health
Association v. Virginia. In that case the court applied the International Shoe basis to continuous mail order solicitation of insurance in
Virginia. 22 In this case the Court also approved of service of process
on the defendant insurance company by mail.
The Court declared in the International Shoe case that the sufficiency of the contacts were not to be measured by mechanical or
quantitative standards.23 However, in another part of the opinion, the
Court cited the Rosenberg24 case and stated that:
• . . the commission of some single or occasional acts of the
corporate agent in the state sufficient to impose an obligation
or liability on the corporation had not been thought sufficient
to confer upon the state authority to enforce it.25
201d. at 317.
21Id. at 320.
22 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
23 Supra note 18, at 319.
24Rosenberg Bros. and Co., Inc., v. Curtis Brown Co., supra note 14.
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The Court also referred to the nonresident motorist and sale of
security cases, as examples of "other such acts [which] because of their
nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission may be
deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit.1 ' 26
As a result of this vagueness, two judicial views developed as to
the interpretation of the newly defined "minimum contact" basis. The
continuity of activity was still required in one view. This view emphasized that the new basis had been formulated in the plural "contacts." It was also pointed out that the precise jurisdictional question
decided in InternationalShoe involved more than sporadic contact, and
that the Court had expressly recognized and approved the Rosenberg
case rule that some single or occasional acts were not a sufficient basis
of jurisdiction. The courts holding this view interpreted the reference
to Hess v. Pawloski as suggesting that continuity was still ordinarily
required and that only in the "exceptional circumstances of dangerous
activity" would a single activity be enough to support personal juris27

diction.

The second view was that a single contact within a state out of
which arose an action in favor of a resident of the state was sufficient
to meet the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. This view
emphasized the Court's declaration that the sufficiency of the contacts
was not to be measured by mechanical or quantitative standards. It
interpreted the reference to Hess v. Pawloski to mean that the foundation or theory underlying the fair play or reasonableness basis was the
police power of the state to protect those falling within the ambit of
the state's protection from problems or evils arising from changed conditions. Thus, the tremendous increase in transactions between nonresidents and residents caused by our commercial expansion and rapid
means of transportation and communication giving rise to legal claims,
has underscored the problem of getting redress for these claims. Under
such interpretation, singlenss of contact or continuity of acts is immatrial as is dangerousness of the act in question. The theory emphasized the interest of the state in aiding its citizens to secure redress
28
for alleged wrongs committed within the state.
It was apparent that an authoritative declaration from the Supreme
Court was needed to clarify the scope of the new basis. This declaration came in the McGee case, where the Court adopted the view of the
courts that had given the "fair play" basis the broadest scope and held
a single-act statute valid.
2 Supra note 3, at 318.
26

Ibid.

27Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F. 2d 184 (2d Cir.
1949, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 867 (1949).
28 This was the view taken principally by many of the state legislatures. See
notes 32-36 infra.
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THE McGEE CASE

In 1944, one Franklin, a resident of California, purchased a life
insurance policy from the Empire Mutual Insurance Company, an Arizona corporation. In 1948, the International Life Insurance Company
agreed with Empire Mutual to assume its insurance obligations. International then mailed a reinsurance certificate to Franklin in California offering to insure him in accordance with the terms of the policy
he held with Empire Mutual. He accepted this offer and from that time
until his death in 1950 paid premiums by mail from his California
home to International's Texas office. Franklin's mother was the beneficiary under the policy. She sent proofs of his death to the respondent
but it refused pay, claiming that he had committed suicide. It appeared
that neither Empire Mutual nor International had ever had any offices
or agents in California. International had never solicited nor had any
insurance business in California apart from the policy involved.
International was served by registered mail at its principal place
of business in Texas, under a California statute subjecting foreign
corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts with residents
even though the corporation cannot be served with process within its
borders.
The Supreme Court held that where, as here, the suit is based on
a foreign corporation's life insurance contract, which has a substantial
connection with the state of suit in that the contract was delivered in
such state, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was
a resident thereof when he died, there was a sufficient contact to meet
the "fair play" basis, namely, that a defendant "have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Thus the
California court had personal jurisdiction of the defendant, Interna2

tional.

In arriving at its decision, the Court considered several policy
factors. Our changed national economy had made a great increase in
commercial transactions between parties from different states, requiring expansion of the concept of due process limitations on personal
jurisdictions over nonresidents. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend itself where he engages in economic activity. The Court
further pointed out that the state has a
...manifest interest in providing an effective means of redress
for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These
residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forcd to
follow the insurance company to a distant state in order to hold
it legally accountable. When claims were small or moderate in2

9 McGee v. International

Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

dividual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses-as here on the
company's defense of suicide-will be found in the insured's
locality. Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if
it is held amenable to suit in California where it had its contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due
process.'o
In short, the rule of the McGee case is that under the "fair play"
basis, contractual contacts of a nonresident with a resident of a state
giving rise to an action in favor of a resident is sufficient to authorize
the state to submit the nonresident to the jurisdiction of state courts
as to such action.
STATE EXPANSION

Before a state can exercise personal jurisdiction, it must have authorized the exercise of such jurisdiction either by statute or judicial
decision.3'
The state of Florida,3

Illinois, 33 Maryland, 34 North Carolina, 5

36

and Vermont, have made major extensions of personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents in tort and contract actions and other states have
expanded by judicial decision. Some of these will now be examined
for the purpose of determining whether or not they are within the
bounds of the expansion heretofore approved by the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The prevalent type of statute applies only to corporations. The
states, with a single exception, have not tried to subject nonresident
individuals to jurisdiction but have confined expansion to foreign corporations. This is probably due to the still-remaining effects of Pennoyer v. Neff.' 7 This variance in treatment does not seem warranted
under the rationale of the Shoe case.' 8 An individual, as well as a

corporation, should be capable of having the "minimum contacts" required by the Shoe case. In accord with this view, the Illinois statute
treats nonresident individuals and foreign corporations in the same
manner.'
30

9

Id. at 223, 224.

"s Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952).
32F.S.A. 47.16 (1953). This statute applies to persons who "carry on a business
or business venture" in Florida if the suit arises out of this activity. See
State ex. rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953) and also Continental Copper and Steel Indus. v. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 140
(Fla. 1958).
33 ILL. Civ. PRAc. AcT §17 (1955).
84 MD. ANN. CODE, 23 §88 (d) (1951); Now, 23 §92 (d) (1957).
- NORTH CAROLINA, G.S. §55-38.1 (1955), now §55-145 (1957).
86 VT. REv. STAT. §1562 (1947).
37 Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 RocKy MvT.

L. REV.
285, 292 (1958).
38 Dambach, PersonalJurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern Trends,
5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 198, 221 (1958).
39 Supra note 33.
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Another general observation on these statutes is that they invariably
require the action to arise out of (or be connected to) the contact
with the forum state. This is so whether the action sounds in tort
or contract. This was the case in both the InternationalShoe and McGee
cases and apparently has established itself as a requirement of due
process where only "minimum contact" is involved.
ToRT

Most of these statutes extend personal jurisdiction to a single
tortious act. Thus, the Illinois statute provides that the Illinois Courts
have jurisdiction over any cause of action arising out of "the commission of a tortious act within this State." 40 This statute was held
valid by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Nelson v. Miller.4 1 In this
case, a Wisconsin resident sent his employee into Illinois for the purpose of delivering some appliances. While the employee was delivering
one appliance he requested the plaintiff to assist in unloading it. The
plaintiff alleged that in the course of this operation the defendant's
employee negligently pushed the stove so as to sever one of the plaintiff's fingers. The above activities were the only contact with Illinois
by the defendant. Plaintiff had defendant served personally in Wisconsin under the Illinois statute. The defendant raised the issue of
the statute's constitutionality. The Supreme Court of Illinois held the
statute valid as applied to the above facts by analogy to the basis of
jurisdiction in automobile accident and sale of security cases. The
court stated:
The question before us is not materially different from that
which was settled more than a generation ago with respect to
statutes providing for substituted service on nonresident motorists who caused injury within a State. The advent of the automobile and the rapid extension of its use had underscored the
problem of the nonresident who enters the State, causes injuries,
and withdraws to the relative sanctuary of his residence beyond
the State's borders. In such circumstances the application of
old, rigorous concepts of "due process of law" to shield the defendant from the process of the courts of the State where the
accident occurred actually resulted in injustice to the persons
injured. In many cases redress for the injury, obtainable only
in a foreign court at considerable expense and under substantial
handicaps, was a practical impossibility. In the light of this situation, there was no injustice to the nonresident in a requirement that he return, to make his defense, to the place to which
he had come voluntarily-to the place in which the injury was
inflicted. In the great majority of cases, because of the availability
of witnesses, the applicability of local law, and other factors,
that place was the most convenient forum for trial. It was inevitable that State legislatures should be aroused by the social
40

Sipra note 33, §17 (1) (b).

4111111. 2d 378, 14,1 N.E. 2d 673 (1957).
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problem thus created, and that they should take steps to make
the nonresident motorist amenable to the process of local courts.
It was equally inevitable that the courts would hold that statutes
enacted in response to this need were valid exercises of the police power, not on conflict with constitutional guaranties ....42
The social problems resulting from automobile accidents, or as
in Doherty from the sale of securities may be of greater magnitude than those resulting from other tortious conduct generally;
but the determination that the degree of need is such as to call
for remedy is to be made by the legislature and not by the courts.
The rational basis of the decision upholding the nonresident
motorist statutes is broad enough to include the case in which
the nonresident defendant causes injury without the intervention of any particular instrumentality. The legislature may direct3
its policy to the fact of the injury as well as to its probability4
The court was also of the opinion that the true basis of jurisdiction
in these cases is to be found "in the legitimate interest of the State in
providing redress in its courts against persons who, having substantial
contacts with the state, incur obligations to those entitled to the State's
protection."

4

4

The court cited two other state decisions and statutes in support of
its holding. One citation involved a Vermont statute which provided
for jurisdiction over any foreign corporation which "commits a tort
in whole or in part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont. ' 45 The
Vermont court had already ruled the statute valid in Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corporation. The tortious conduct in this case involved the negligent repairing of a roof by the nonresident defendant
46
corporation in Vermont.

Another decision of interest pointed out in the Nelson case is Johns
v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 47 which held valid a Maryland

statute subjecting foreign corporations to jurisdiction in "any cause
of action arising out of a contract made within this state, or a liability
incurred for acts done within this state, whether or not such foreign
corporation is doing or has done business. '48 It should be noted that
in contrast to the Smyth case the court here did not rely solely on the
alleged tort alone on which to find a basis, but the court pointed out
other activities of the defendant in the state.
In a recent decision, Painterv. Home Finance Company, the North
Carolina court held that its courts could validly exercise jurisdiction
over a nonresident corporation under its statute where the cause of
action arose out of tortious conduct of defendant's agents committed
42Id., 143 N.E. 2d at 677.
431d., 143 N.E. 2d at 679.

4Ibid.
-5Supra note 36.
46 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951).
4T89
F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
48
Supra note 34.
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in North Carolina. The conduct alleged consisted of the wrongful
taking of a mortgaged vehicle, invasion of privacy, unlawful public
threat of arrest, and for duress and suffering resulting from the
threat. 49
While the United States Supreme Court has not actually ruled that
a single tort is a sufficient basis in anything but the automobile accident
cases, the McGee case employed the same rationale as the Nelson case50
and did tactly recognize the validity of the Smyth decision by referring
to it in a footnote. Therefore, it would appear that in cases where the
defendant has committed a tortious act in the forum state and injury
results there out of the act, there is a sufficient basis under the InternationalShoe and McGee cases.
In all of the foregoing cases there were some acts committed by
the defendant or his agent in the forum state. In some of the situations that arise it is apparent that the only contact may be a resulting
injury from use of an item in the state. Will the mere fact of injury
alone be an adequate basis of jurisdiction on which to ground an in
personam action?
In Hellreigel v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., an attempt was made to
expand the basis to an injury resulting from the use of a lawnmower
within Illinois. The lawnmower in question was sold outside Illinois
to an independent distributor who resold the lawnmower to the plaintiff in Illinois. The defendant's only contact with Illinois had been the
use of his products there. The court held that the Illinois statute was
not intended to cover a situation such as this. It was the purpose of
the statute that certain acts must be committed in Illinois and more
than mere damage must occur there. " By way of dicta, however, the
court added:
Since I hold that sections 16 and 17(1) (b) cannot be read to
authorize out of state service ...

[in this case]. I do not reach

the question whether a different reading of those provisions
would render
them unconstitutional, but I doubt that it
52
would ....

49245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E. 2d 73 (1957). The statute involved is cited at note 35.
It permits state courts to take jurisdiction over any cause of action arising

"Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of repeated acti-

vity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance."

50

N.C. G.S. §55-145 (a) (4) (1957).
Compare the language of McGee, supra note 30, with that of the Nelson case,

supra note 42.

51157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).

In a case where the plaintiff failed to
plead that any of the tortious acts in an action in fraud occurred in Illinois,
the court held that the state could not exercise jurisdiction. Hardy v. Banders
Life and Casualty Co., 19 Ill. App. 2d 75, 153 N.E. 2d 269 (1958).
52 157 F. Supp. at 721. Ehrenzweig, supra note 37, at 289, suggests that the Illinois Act could be interpreted to read that the occurrence of the injury would
be sufficient to give Illinois jurisdiction as seen in the McGee language that
a state has a "manifest interest" in providing residents with a means of
redress. The author points out that such a result would be very harsh even
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A North Carolina statute gives that state jurisdiction in situations
where the foreign corporation reasonably expects its product to be used
in North Carolina and the cause of action arises from such use of the
product in the state. The court has refused to allow extension of personal jurisdiction under this provision. 53
It would appear that mere injury from use of defendant's product
in a state is not an adequate minimum contact. No decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States nor rationale upon which it is
founded appears to warrant a conclusion that it would be sufficient.
CONTRACT

Insurance comprises the greater part of litigation in the contract
field. As to these, the McGee case has made objective much of what
was left unsettled previously.
Insurance has long been regarded as an area of law that can be
subjected to heavy state regulation.54 It involves a great many of the
people of a state and the insurer may never do anything but use the
mails to secure or carry on business. Because of the prevalence and
special interest, insurance is usually regarded in the same police power
category as autos and securities. Whether or not this was the tenor
of the McGee case is not certain and perhaps the rule of the case
should not be restricted to the insurance field but extended to include
all contracts. The special interest of the state in insurance has given
rise to special legislation in most states aimed at subjecting nonresident
insurers to jurisdiction for very minimum contacts with the state's
residents. 55 A recent state court decision which involved a situation
much like the McGee case is Ross v. American Income Life Insurance
6
Company.
In this case the North Carolina court held that the state could exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of one policy
delivered in the state. The case relied on McGee to quite an extent.
The court did point out however that only the cause of action for
fraudulent breach of policy arose ex contractu and was within the
scope of the statute. But the cause of action for deceit in inducing the
plaintiff to purchase was ex delicto and did not arise out of the contract,
thus it was not within the statute's purpose.
granted that an injury is a substantial contact with the state because the
defendant has no control over the connection with the state.
53 N.C.G.S. §55-145 (a) (3) (1957). Erlanger Mills Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,

Inc., 239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956). The court said that "It might require
corporations from coast to coast having the most indirect, casual, and tenous
connection with a state to answer frivolous law suits in its courts. To permit
this could seriously impair the guarantee which due process seeks to secure."

(p. 507). See also Putnam v. Triangle Publications Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96
S.E. 2d 445 (1957).
54 Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950).
55 See 44 A.L.R. 2d 416 (1955) for a complete discussion of this area.
56 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.E. 2d 743 (1958).
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COMMENTS

It can be argued that the McGee case reasoning should be restricted
to its special regulatory field. 7 This would take much out of the effect
of the decision in regard to the general contract field. However, in the
McGee case, the Court again referred in a footnote to a state decision
involving a general contract. This was the S. Howes Co. v. W. P.
Milling Co.5s In this case the action was for a breach of warranty.
The Oklahoma court stated as to the defendant's contention that there
could be no basis of jurisdiction:
Such argument is not based on reason and justice. Courts of a
particular state should have jurisdiction over all disputes arising
out of contracts made (to be performed) within this state, regardless of the number of contracts of the defendant which were
made (or to be performed) there. 59
Several states have now included in their statutes provisions aimed
at gaining jurisdiction over nonresidents by virtue of a single contract
in the state."° In view of the tacit approval of the S. Howes Co. v. W.
P. Milling Co. case in McGee, such statutes are probably valid.6 1
EXPANSION UNDER EXISTING "DOING BUSINESS" STATUTES

In the discussion thus far the cases have involved statutes drawn
by legislatures to meet the new "jurisdictional yardstick" set up by the
InternationalShoe case and now implemented by the McGee decision.
Some states have met the new standard by judicially adapting old
"doing business" statutes to new tests set up by these cases. The general theory underlying this is that the basis required by the particular
state's "doing business" statute is to be equated with the minimum
contacts test as expressed by our highest Court.6 2

There is an indica-

s7Hoffman, The Plastic Frontiers of State Judicial Power, 24

BROOKLYN

L.

REv. 291, 305, 307 (1958).
58.- Okl. -, 277 P. 2d 655 (1954). The statute was a typical "doing business"
provision. 18 OsL. STAT. ANN. §§1.17 and 472 (1951).
59

Id.,

277 P. 2d at 657. The case was dismissed on stipulation after appeal to

the Supreme Court, 348 U.S. 983 (1955).

Supra note 34. The Illinois provision, Civ. PaAc. Acr §17 (1) (a), does not
specifically state that it covers "any cause of action arising out of a contract
made within the state," as does the Maryland statute. However, it would
probably be extended to apply to the single contract situation, under its
provision "The transaction of any business within this State."
61
60

Another recent expansion of state jurisdiction is the presence in the forum of
a single risk insured by the defendant. Thus, in Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., the court held valid use of a Louisiana statute
subjecting to the jurisdiction of the state a foreign liability insurer, whose
only contact with the state was the one insured auto. 159 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.
La. 1958). The provision involved was a 1956 amendment to Louisiana's
nonresident motorist statute, LSA-R.S. 13: 3474. Illinois' Crv. PRAc. Acr 17
(1) (d) provides for jurisdiction over anyone "Contracting to insure any
person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting."
62
Henry R. Jahn and Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P. 2d 437
(1958); Carl F. W. Borgward G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, - Cal. 2d -, 330
P. 2d 789 (1958).
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tion from dicta in a recent Wisconsin decision that this state's statute
will be so interpreted. 63
We have no hesitancy in holding that the objective of the statute
was to give citizens of Wisconsin the right to make use of the
courts of this State in instituting causes of action against any
foreign corporation, which actually is carrying on business activities within the State, subject only to such limitations as are
imposed by the United States Constitution. We feel certain that
neither the Juducial Council in proposing the changed wording
of Sec. 262.09(4) nor this court in promulgating the same, had
any intention to hamstring such right by adopting into such subsection any definitions of "doing business" laid in past court
decisions, which definitions contained limitations which mistakenly were 6 4assumed to be required by the United States Con-

stitution.

CONCLUSION
Just how far courts and legislatures can proceed in expanding jurisdiction remains a problem. Since the McGee case the Supreme Court
has spoken again. In Hanson v. Denckla,"5 after referring to the trend
toward expanding jurisdiction under the InternationalShoe and McGee
cases, the Court said:
It is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts.... Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territoriallimitations on the power of the respective
States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign
tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he
has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him. 6 [Emphasis supplied.]
It would seem from this language that a warning sign is up. State
courts and legislatures should tread cautiously in expanding jurisdiction, otherwise litigants may, after obtaining judgments by default,
find them invalid because of lack of jurisdiction and unenforceable
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.67
FRANCIS U. SEROOGY
63 Huck v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. and 0. Ry. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 132, 90 N.W. 2d
154 (1958).
64 Id. at 137, 90 N.W. 2d at 157, 158.
65 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958).
661d. at 1296.
67 An excerpt from the Report of the Committee on Federal-State Relationships
as affected by Judicial Decisions of the Conference of Chief Justices points
this out: "Formalistic doctrines and dogmas have been replaced by a more
flexible and realistic approach, and this trend has been carried forward in
subsequent cases leading up to and including McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co ...

until halted by Hanson v. Denckla. . .

."

U.S. News and

World Report, October 3, 1958, p. 96. See also Keane and Collins, supra note
11, at footnote 48 of that article.

